Beijing Signals Reset with Carney, Public Perceptions of China Surpass Views of U.S.
Canadian public opinion of Beijing and Washington move in opposite directions as China welcomes Mark Carney's election.
This week’s edition of IPD’s Canada-China Brief covers a sea change in Canadian public opinion towards the U.S. and China, Beijing’s indications of a diplomatic opening after Mark Carney’s election, and more.
Data Dive
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Trading places: Recent public polling has shown that Canadian openness to developing trade and ties with China has witnessed a relative rise.
The takeaways:
Public support for increasing trade with China has more than quintupled since 2022, from 5% to 26% — a 520% rise
3 in 10 Canadians now believe trade with China should grow, while 2 in 5 Canadians believe it should be maintained
Support for cutting trade with China has shrank approximately 62% since 2022, or an absolute drop of 41%
From the Experts
On Mark Carney’s election and Canada between the U.S. and China:
Jeremy Paltiel
Senior Fellow, Institute for Peace & Diplomacy; Professor Emeritus, Carleton University
Ever since the end of the Obama administration, the U.S. has been steadily moving towards a zero-sum relationship with China. President Trump has used tariffs and trade as a weapon and has now served notice, foreshadowed by clause 32.10 (A) of CUSMA, to punish any country that makes a deal with China that compromises U.S. aims. Canada already faces unjustified discriminatory tariffs from the U.S. even though with our EV tariff we pre-emptively sided with it on trade and security and reneged on WTO commitments. Our trade relationship with China has been damaged accordingly.
Mr. Carney, our newly elected Prime Minister went to Washington to try to seek a comprehensive deal on trade and security. Despite the amicable tone of the White house, it does not look like a comprehensive deal is in the works or is practicable. Canada’s trade dependence on the U.S. is such that we cannot afford to play China off against America. Still, we have to avoid pre-emptively playing into the zero-sum politics of Sino-American economic and security rivalry. Any hope to diversify trade and work towards greater strategic autonomy in the economic realm requires room to maneuver. China is the number one trade partner of more than 100 countries and is the main trade partner of all the target countries in the Indo-Pacific identified as our diversification frontier in our Indo-Pacific Strategy. Building a wall around fortress North America can only deepen dependence on the U.S. for trade and security and eliminate any leverage we have on Washington. It would effectively turn us into the 51st state without having a vote for Congress or the President. That is less influence than Puerto Rico.
We should strengthen common interests in security with the U.S. – such as defence of the Arctic and support of NATO — but preserve freedom to pursue economic opportunities. We will have to invest more in our common defence. We will strengthen and deepen security integration but at the same time we must have a clear division of labour to ensure our U.S. partner recognizes and acknowledges the added value Canada brings to the table. There will be tension where trade and security overlap. We may share an interest in securing a Western technological edge, but we cannot cede unilateral dominance and defer to the U.S. in areas where Canada is actually and potentially competitive. We cannot pay tribute to access the U.S. market at the price of abandoning competitiveness in high value-added industries at the frontier of technology. Cooperatively and creatively, we will have find ways to secure both technology and competitiveness.
Our commitment to our own sovereignty, welfare and competitiveness must come first, and that means we will have to disabuse our American partners of any conceit we will concede or support U.S. domination at our own expense. Along the way we also have to recognize that we are competitors in important export markets. We cannot relinquish these for the sake of access to the U.S. market. In oil and LNG as well as in agriculture and seafood, Canada and the U.S. are competitors in the Chinese and other Asian markets. We cannot sacrifice our comparative advantage in diversifying our trade to expose ourselves to greater dependence on the uncertain U.S. market.
There is tough bargaining ahead. Despite our vulnerability, we cannot afford to align with the U.S. in a zero-sum game in global trade. Together with our European allies who share our concerns about China’s global role, we have to reassure China and preferred partners in Asia that we are fully committed to pursuing trade and investment wherever security risks are manageable and fundamental values are respected. “Small yard, high fence” may no longer be the slogan of the current U.S. administration but our thinking with respect to security, trade, and investment must still be guided by carefully circumscribed and clearly delimited prohibitions and cautions to salvage what remains of an open multilateral economic order. As a middle power, Canada must always work to enlarge and protect the global commons. Our policy must work strenuously to prevent appropriation and predatory encroachment on the global commons by the great powers by whatever name in whatever guise.
David Carment
Senior Fellow, Institute for Peace & Diplomacy; Professor, Carleton University
Mark Carney is navigating a system of emerging multipolarity, characterised by the rise of China, the strategic autonomy of the EU, a resurgent Russia, and a transactional U.S. foreign policy. This fragmented and unpredictable international environment is evident in Canada’s simultaneous exposure to U.S. tariffs, Chinese retaliation, and EU regulatory divergence, which collectively constrain Ottawa's strategic autonomy. For example, U.S. legislation, such as the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) and the CHIPS Act, prioritize technological self-sufficiency and decoupling aimed at harming China. But they also have huge costs for allied economies including Canada.
While it is common in Western policy discourse to portray China as a state guided primarily by a realist worldview, focused on power maximization, sovereignty, and strategic dominance, this simplistic characterisation overlooks China’s consistent and often strategic engagement with multilateralism. There is significant room for Carney's government to engage China constructively, including international institutions such as the UN, the WTO, and multilateral development banks. For example, China's leadership in launching the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and support for initiatives such as the Paris Agreement reflect a pragmatic understanding of foreign policy that should appeal to Mark Carney.
The shared goal is to not only enhance global influence but to counterbalance U.S. influence. This is because U.S. foreign policy is particularly dangerous for Canade due to its subtle but relentless erosion of Canadian institutional capacity and policy autonomy. U.S. economic coercion is slow-moving, legally ambiguous, and distributed across multiple sectors — telecommunications, education, security, defence, resources, critical minerals, real estate. The cumulative impact of U.S. coercion is a significant: weakening of democratic institutions, compromising economic resilience, and exposing vulnerabilities in regulatory regimes, strategic infrastructure as well as defence and security.
Canada would be best served if its defence and security elites acknowledged that in the eyes of the Trump administration we are no more than an instrument to be used by America in its confrontation with China. Carney must not only recalibrate Canada's alliance management and investment policies. He must invest in independent strategic capacity — including intelligence, defence, innovation, and diplomacy. The key question for Mark Carney is whether he can maintain a distinctive foreign policy rooted in liberal internationalism while navigating a global environment defined by realist power politics, asymmetrical coercion, and populist disregard for allied sovereignty.
Jocelyn Coulon
Advisor, Institute for Peace & Diplomacy; Former Senior Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Il faut remettre à plat les relations avec la Chine
Au cours d’une campagne électorale, les candidats ont la fâcheuse tendance à faire des déclarations radicales ou exagérées. Il s’agit la plupart du temps de postures politiques destinées à se montrer plus fermes que leurs opposants sur une question en particulier. La dernière campagne n’a pas fait exception à cette mauvaise habitude. La Chine en a été la cible.
Le premier ministre Mark Carney a fait deux déclarations qui ont complètement manqué de tact. À la question de savoir quelle était la plus grande menace à la sécurité du Canada, il a répondu la Chine. Il en a rajouté en précisant que le Canada voulait « diversifier notre clientèle en commerçant avec des partenaires qui pensent comme nous. La liste des pays qui partagent nos valeurs en Asie ne comprend pas la Chine. »
Voilà deux déclarations qui pourraient venir le hanter lorsque le moment sera venu de transiger avec la réalité d’un monde en plein changement.
La Chine n’est pas notre ennemi. Elle est devenue une superpuissance économique, diplomatique et militaire en respectant plus ou moins les règles internationales, si on en croit Upstart: How China Became a Great Power, l’excellent livre de Oriana Skylar Mastro, professeure de science politique à l’université Stanford, publié l’an dernier et que nos politiciens devraient lire.
Le Canada a donc tout intérêt à remettre à plat ses relations avec la Chine afin de profiter de son dynamisme. Il ne faut pas craindre le dialogue et l’engagement. Il en va de notre intérêt national et de la stabilité des relations internationales. Nous n’avons rien à gagner en nous isolant, d’où cette étrange idée de n’avoir de relations qu’avec ceux qui pensent comme nous. Si c’est la voie que nous voulons emprunter, nous risquons d’être très seul. Le monde se recompose tous les jours, l’Occident n’a plus le monopole du pouvoir et le temps n’est pas à l’érection de nouveaux murs.
Mark Carney a brillamment réussi sa rencontre avec Donald Trump. Il a établi les lignes rouges de son gouvernement, rappelé la nécessité de respecter l’intégrité territoriale et les frontières du Canada, et s’est montré ouvert à la renégociation de l’accord de libre-échange avec les États-Unis et le Mexique. Il est temps de faire de même avec la Chine.
It is necessary to reset relations with China.
During an election campaign, candidates have an unfortunate tendency to make radical or exaggerated statements. Most of the time, these are political postures meant to appear tougher than their opponents on a particular issue. The last campaign was no exception to this bad habit. China was the target.
Prime Minister Mark Carney made two statements that completely lacked tact. When asked what the greatest threat to Canada’s security was, he replied, “China.” He went further by stating that Canada wanted to “diversify with like-minded partners. The partners in Asia that share our values don't include China.”
These are two statements that could come back to haunt him when the time comes to deal with the reality of a world in constant change.
China is not our enemy. It has become an economic, diplomatic, and military superpower by more or less adhering to international rules, according to Upstart: How China Became a Great Power, an excellent book by Oriana Skylar Mastro, a political science professor at Stanford University, published last year and which our politicians should read.
Canada has every interest in resetting its relations with China to take advantage of its dynamism. We must not fear dialogue and engagement. It is in our national interest and the stability of international relations. We have nothing to gain by isolating ourselves, hence this strange idea of having relations only with those who think like us. If that is the path we choose, we risk being very alone. The world is being reshaped everyday, the West no longer has a monopoly on power, and this is not the time for building new walls.
Mark Carney brilliantly succeeded in his meeting with Donald Trump. He established his government’s red lines, reminded the need to respect Canada's territorial integrity and borders, and showed openness to renegotiating the free trade agreement with the United States and Mexico. It is time to do the same with China.
The Word in China
IPD brings what scholars and opinion leaders in China have to say on Canada and the challenges both countries face. See more translated commentary below the paywall cut by subscribing now for just $5 a month.
Zhang Chunlin
Former Lead Specialist, Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation Department, World Bank; Academician, Caixin Insight | READ
Due to America’s economic power, the current global trade order faces dual threats even in markets outside the U.S. The first threat is the potential replacement of existing global trade rules with U.S.-centric ones. Leveraging its comprehensive strength, particularly its market influence, the Trump administration could coerce many trade partners into compromise and negotiations, adopting a divide and conquer strategy. The outcomes of such negotiations might include a series of bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements (e.g. USMCA) that incorporate provisions targeting China or other third parties. These agreements, guided by an "America First" principle, would largely be crafted, interpreted, and adjudicated by the U.S.
Their implementation could result in trade between participating economies and the U.S. — and even a portion of their trade with other economies — being governed by U.S.-designed rules rather than the existing WTO framework or other multilateral norms. Consequently, "America First" trade rules could gradually supplant the free-trade-oriented principles underpinning the current global trade order. The extent of this substitution would depend on the U.S.’s bargaining power. For instance, if the U.S. pressures Mexico and Canada to violate their CPTPP commitments by making concessions that harm other CPTPP members, the agreement itself could be undermined.
Xu Yanzhuo
Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences | READ
The top priority for the new Carney government is undoubtedly to reach an agreement with the Trump administration on tariffs and trade. Given Trump's repeated "51st state" threats, issues related to Canada-U.S. trade, security, and military spending are likely to become intertwined. The Carney government may be compelled to make concessions to the United States in several critical areas, including increased defense spending, automotive manufacturing, and critical mineral supply chains. These compromises would aim to salvage the Canada-U.S. bilateral political and trade relationship while striving to maintain Canada's fundamental negotiating positions.
Simultaneously, Carney will leverage his extensive European networks and economic expertise to deepen transatlantic security and defense cooperation with Europe, thereby reducing Canada's reliance on U.S. defense procurement. He will also promote trade diversification with Europe and some Asian countries (such as Australia and Japan), advance domestic energy and natural gas pipeline infrastructure, and establish an energy corridor connecting the east and west coasts. This aims to find alternative markets for Canadian energy exports, reduce economic dependence on the United States, enhance economic resilience, lower interprovincial trade barriers, reduce housing development costs, and mitigate economic losses caused by U.S. tariffs.
Top Story
China Congratulates Carney, Offers Diplomatic Reset
‘Move forward and look ahead’ — As Mark Carney assumed office, China has repeatedly given positive signals on a fresh start to the relationship:
In Beijing’s first reaction to Carney’s election, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun stated that “China’s position on its relations with Canada is consistent and clear. China stands ready to grow its relations with Canada on the basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit.”
Days before, Chinese Ambassador to Canada Wang Di gave an interview to The Canadian Press, noting that vis-à-vis Washington, “Canada has not backed down” and that “China and Canada are the only two countries in the world that have taken concrete and real countermeasures against the U.S. tariffs.”
Wang went on to say that “we want to avoid the situation where the humanity is brought back to a world of the law of the jungle where the strong prey on the weak again. I think it is fair to say that both Canada and China have shouldered our international and historical responsibilities.”
On current bilateral disputes on EVs, he added that “China's countermeasures are not permanent. They can be adjusted in light with the adjustments and changes of the Canadian policies… China is ready to move forward and look ahead. We hope that Canada can work together with China and meet us halfway.”
During Carney’s first visit to Washington, a senior official reported that the Prime Minister’s working lunch with Donald Trump was dominated by foreign policy discussions including on China, though the U.S. President did not make requests of Canada on any particular issues.
What experts think — Observers have noted that a new Prime Minister is an immediate opportunity to turn the page on trade with Beijing:
Jessica Green, Professor at the University of Toronto, frankly stated that Canada’s Chinese electric vehicles tariffs are “a dumb policy” which Ottawa “followed suit by demonstrating our allegiance [to the United States]. The ground has shifted… making it an even dumber policy."
Josipa Petrunic, President of the Canadian Urban Transit Research & Innovation Consortium, said that “Canada was not thinking for itself last year. We have gotten away with being a bit intellectually lazy on the trade front because we always assumed we had this really positive partner next door.”
Andre Harpe, Chair of the Canadian Canola Growers Association, emphasized that "we're the ones taking the brunt of the hit right now. We have a new Canadian government coming in… as job one, I would very much like to see them deal with these tariffs."
Matias Margulis and Kristen Hopewell of the University of British Columbia reflected that “Canada imposed its tariffs to align with those of the U.S., which are both in contravention of WTO law… U.S. tariffs are now a far greater threat to Canada than Chinese EVs. The knee-jerk response of blindly following U.S. trade policies has only harmed Canada.”
Both added that “Canada’s new government should withdraw the current tariffs on Chinese steel, aluminum and EVs and instead follow the European approach… It is crucial for Canada to have an independent trade policy that follows the international rules-based system.”
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Event Feature
Canada-China Business Relations: Outlook Under a New Government
On May 13 next week, the Canada China Business Council hosts a virtual panel session on the potential for recalibrating bilateral relations, while also assessing trade complexities from the United States and their impact on trade and business relations with China.
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